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Five Facts about Value-Added Exports
and Implications for Macroeconomics
and Trade Research
Robert C. Johnson

I

nternational trade data record the gross value of goods as they cross borders.
This poses a challenge for researchers who want to connect canonical international trade and macroeconomic models, which are typically cast in value-added
terms, with the data. The most common approach has been to treat gross trade
data as if it is comparable to data on value added. In the past, this assumption was
tolerable. Vertical specialization in trade—that is, the use of imports to produce
exports—was limited in most countries (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001). In other
words, gross exports contained very nearly 100 percent domestic value added.
In recent decades, the emergence of global supply chains has changed matters.
As inputs pass through these chains, they cross borders many times. This means
that gross trade data include substantial double-counting, so gross exports overstate
the amount of domestic value-added in exports. When supply chains span multiple
countries, it also means that bilateral gross exports do not tell us where the value
added embodied in those exports is ultimately consumed. As a result, gross trade is
an increasingly misleading guide to how value added is exchanged between countries.
This realization has prompted concerns that gross trade data distort perceptions about the nature of international integration and the role of particular
countries in international markets, which in turn leads to tensions in the world trade
system. Lamy (2011), for example, emphasizes that a clearer view of how countries
are linked together via global supply chains breaks down mercantilist (“us” versus
“them”) views of trade. Prompted by these real world concerns, along with the
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desire to measure trade in a manner consistent with the value-added thinking that
underlies popular models, there has been a recent push toward developing new
value-added measures of trade.
To measure trade in value added, we need to follow goods through the global
supply chain from input producers to final consumers, allocating the value added
in final goods to producers at each stage. Of course, this is easier said than done.
While national input-output accounts describe domestic supply chains, they stop
at the border. To overcome this problem, recent work has combined national
input-output tables with bilateral trade data to construct input-output tables with
global scope. These global input-output tables describe input shipments across both
sectors and countries, and hence enable us to trace the value added embodied in
final goods back to its source. With this new data, we can measure the hidden trade
in value added underlying gross trade.
In this paper, I highlight one measure of trade in value added—“value-added
exports.” Value-added exports measure the amount of domestic value added embodied
in final expenditure in each destination ( Johnson and Noguera 2012a). Just as gross
exports break down gross output sold across destinations, value-added exports break
down GDP sold across destinations. This value-added export concept is the appropriate
measure of exports in international models that are written in value-added terms.
After describing how value-added exports are computed, I summarize five key
facts about differences between gross and value-added exports. First, these differences
are large and growing over time, currently around 25 percent. Second, manufacturing
trade looks more important (relative to services) in gross than value-added terms.
Third, these differences are heterogenous across countries, with value-added exports
ranging from 50 percent (Taiwan) to 90 percent (Russia) of gross exports. Fourth, the
differences between gross and value-added exports are heterogeneous across bilateral
partners, with even more variation across partners than across individual countries.
Fifth, these differences are changing unevenly over time across countries and partners, with fast-growing emerging markets and pairs of countries that adopt bilateral
trade agreements seeing larger declines in value-added relative to gross exports.
Taking these five facts into account points researchers toward better quantitative
answers to important macroeconomic and trade questions. To illustrate this point,
I discuss how value-added exports can be applied in analysis of some widely discussed
questions. In macroeconomics, value-added exports help quantify the strength of
demand spillovers, the consequences of relative price movements for competitiveness, and the size of relative price changes needed to close trade imbalances. In trade,
value-added exports can be applied in analysis of the impact of frictions on trade, the
role of endowments and comparative advantage in trade, and trade policy.

Background: Computing Value-Added Exports
A basic fact of national income accounting is that expenditure on final goods
equals the amount of value added generated during the production process.
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Therefore, final expenditure directly tells us how much value added is consumed
in each country. But the national accounts do not tell us where that value added
comes from.
For specific goods (like iPods or notebook PCs), we can try to decompose the
value added embodied in them across countries by breaking them apart and examining their constituent parts (Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009; Debrick, Kraemer,
and Linden 2010). This deconstructive approach is conceptually straightforward,
but complicated in practice. One reason is that the production process has many
layers. It is not enough to break the iPod into component parts (for example, the
screen, disk drive, plastic shell); one needs to also break down those components
into subcomponents (metal, plastic, and so on). Pushing further, even the subcomponents need to be further broken down until one knows where the value added in
the metal, plastic, and other basic inputs originates.
The goal of this process is to be able to make statements like “one third of the
$299 value of an iPod sold in the United States is Japanese value added.” 1 Though
this value added is produced in Japan, it is consumed in the United States. As a
matter of definition, we then say that Japan exports roughly $100 of value added to
the United States as part of the iPod production process.
Implementing this approach on a good-by-good basis and then aggregating up
to produce aggregate value-added export data is nigh impossible. Nonetheless, the
basic logic of this good-by-good calculation can be adapted to track value added in
the aggregate. To see this, it is useful to think of the process in two steps.
The first step is to measure how much output from each source country is
needed to produce the final goods that are consumed in a given destination. For
example, how much Japanese gross output (disk drives, metal, and everything else)
is needed to produce final goods (iPods) consumed in the United States? In this
step, we need to know not only how many Japanese disk drives are used, but also
how much Japanese metal and plastic are used in production of those disk drives.
The second step is to measure how much local value added is generated in
production of that gross output. That is, how much Japanese value added is generated in assembling the disk drives, plus how much Japanese value added is embodied
in the metal used?
To implement this two-step approach economy-wide, we need to describe
the sector-level production process in a manner analogous to how we described the
production process for individual goods. That is, we need to measure the value
of final goods purchased from each source country and measure input use and
value-added contributions along the production chain. To do this, we turn to a
1
This estimate is based on Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick (2009). It is the value of iPod components
from Japanese-headquartered companies (for example, the hard drive from Toshiba) divided by the
sales price of the iPod. However, this estimate does not actually measure true value added by Japanese
suppliers. First, it does not identify where Toshiba produces the hard drive, which determines the country
in which value added is recorded. Second, it only captures the last layer of the production process. For
example, it does not identify whether Toshiba uses imported inputs to produce the hard drive. To my
knowledge, no product case study has yet been able to address these problems.
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global input-output framework. On the input side, global input-output tables record
the sectors and countries from which inputs are sourced to produce output in a
given country and sector. On the output side, they record the destinations to which
final goods from each sector are shipped. Combining these, we can take final goods
shipments and trace backwards using input requirements to allocate the value added
in those final goods to their source.
For example, suppose we see final goods being shipped from US manufacturers to Canadian final consumers. Then, if we know the sector and country origin
of inputs used in US manufacturing (for example, inputs from Japan used in US
manufacturing), this is analogous to knowing the iPod’s components. Building on
this, if we also know where those input suppliers get their own inputs (for example,
inputs from China used by Japan), this is analogous to knowing the breakdown
of components into subcomponents. Further, the input-output accounts record
how much value added is generated in producing output in each country and
sector, which enables us to convert gross production at each stage to value added.
In this way, applying input-output accounting principles, we approximate the iPod
accounting exercise for the economy as a whole.2
The main challenge in implementing this approach lies in assembling the data
needed to form the global input-output framework. In an ideal world, national
statistical authorities would coordinate to produce these input-output accounts.
As a second best, various researchers and organizations have assembled synthetic
input-output tables from existing national accounts and trade data. The basic procedure uses bilateral trade data to split sector-level multilateral final and intermediate
goods imports, which are reported in official input-output tables, across source
countries. The result is a global input-output table, which describes bilateral final
and intermediate input use. Table 1 lists several public use datasets that contain
national input-output tables, global or regional input-output tables, or value-added
trade data.
Not surprisingly, different research teams have used varying data sources and
assumptions in constructing these global input-output tables. I will not dwell here
on the many different choices that have been made by various researchers. Rather,
I want to highlight that there is tremendous agreement across alternative data
sets about how value-added exports compare to gross exports. The core facts that
I discuss below are robust across alternative datasets.

2

To sketch the underlying math, suppose we observe a global input-output matrix, denoted A, which is
a square matrix of input use requirements with dimensions equal to the number of countries times the
number of sectors. The columns of this matrix describe input requirements for producing gross output
in each country and sector, with elements equal to the value of inputs purchased from a particular source
country and sector as a share of gross sector-level output in the destination. The “Leontief inverse” of
the global input-output matrix, given by (I − A)−1, tells us how much output from each source country
and sector is needed to produce any vector of final goods, where final goods are identified by sector and
country source. To convert these gross output requirements into value added, multiply by value added to
output ratios in the source country and sector, which can be obtained by taking one minus the column
sums of A. See Johnson and Noguera (2012a) for details.
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Table 1
Public Datasets for Research on Value-Added Exports
Name of dataset

Key features

Selected research using this data

Global Trade Analyis
Project Database

Input-output tables for over
100 countries for various benchmark
years, mostly after 2000. https://
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu

Trefler and Zhu (2010), Daudin,
Rifflart, and Schweisguth (2011),
Johnson and Noguera (2012a), and
Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014)

World Input-Output
Database

Global tables covering OECD
countries and major emerging
markets from 1995–2011.
http://www.wiod.org

Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzales (2013),
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013),
Timmer, Los, Stehrer, and de Vries
(2013)

IDE-JETRO Asian
Input-Output Tables

Regional tables covering 8 East
Asian countries at five-year intervals
between 1985 and 2000.
http://www.ide.go.jp

Various chapters in Hiratsuka and
Uchida (2010), IDE-JETRO and WTO
(2011), Puzzello (2012)

WTO-OECD TiVA
Database (Trade in
Value Added)

Value-added exports and other
measures of global supply chain
activity for 57 countries in 1995,
2000, 2005, 2008 and 2009.
http://stats.oecd.org

De Backer and Miroudot (2013)

OECD Input-Output
Tables

Input-output tables for OECD
countries and major emerging
markets, available various years from
1970–2005. http://www.oecd.org
/trade/input-outputtables.htm

Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001),
Johnson and Noguera (2012b, 2014)

Five Facts about Value-Added Exports
This section reviews five high-level facts about how value-added exports
compare to gross exports for the world as a whole, across sectors, across countries,
and across bilateral trade partners.
Fact 1: World value-added exports are equal to about 70–75 percent of gross exports today,
down from about 85 percent in the 1970s and 1980s.
Recent estimates suggest that value-added exports are equal to 70–75 percent
of the value of gross exports. Using the World Input-Output Database, the ratio of
value-added to gross exports was about 0.71 in 2008. Johnson and Noguera (2014)
put it at about 0.76 in the same year. Johnson and Noguera (2012a) report that the
median ratio of value-added to gross exports across 94 countries was 0.73 in 2004.
Despite differences in underlying data and methods, these estimates lie within a
comfortingly narrow range.
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The ratio of value-added to gross trade has declined over time, down from
around 85 percent in the early 1970s ( Johnson and Noguera 2014). This decline
implies that there is more double counting in gross trade data now than in the
past. This increased double counting is symptomatic of the growing importance
of global supply chains in mediating trade, as goods cross borders more than once
when supply chains span multiple countries.3
One important feature of the data is that the decline in value-added relative to
gross exports occurs almost entirely after 1990 ( Johnson and Noguera 2014). This
decline coincides with rapid changes in the world economy: trade liberalization in
emerging markets, the expansion of the European Union, the adoption of major
regional trade agreements, and the information technology revolution. Writ large,
these events lowered international trade costs, induced substitution of foreign for
domestic input suppliers, and drove down the value-added content of trade.
Fact 2: Manufacturing trade is relatively smaller, and services trade relatively larger, when
measured in value-added terms.
For the world as a whole, manufacturing accounts for nearly 70 percent, and
services account for 20 percent, of total gross exports. In contrast, manufacturing
and services both account for about 40 percent of total value-added exports. This
reallocation of trade shares is illustrated in Figure 1.
Put differently, the ratio of value-added to gross exports is lower for manufacturing than services trade. There are two reasons for this. First, gross manufacturing
exports include value added from the services sector, because manufacturing firms
buy services as inputs. The value-added export data strip this services value added
out of manufacturing exports and reassign it to the services sector. Second, manufacturing features a higher degree of vertical specialization than services (that is, a
higher import content of exports), which pushes down the ratio of value-added to
gross exports in manufacturing relative to other sectors.
Fact 3: Across countries, value-added exports range from 50 to 90 percent of the value of
gross exports.
There is wide variation across countries in the ratio of value-added to gross
exports. Table 2 reports the ratio of value-added to gross exports in 2008 for the
top 20 exporting countries, computed using the World Input-Output Database.
Among these countries, the range is roughly 0.5 to 0.9. Using a broader 89 country
sample from the Global Trade Analysis Project database, in Johnson and Noguera
(2012a), we document a 10th–90th percentile spread of about 0.6 to 0.85 in 2004.

3
Fally (2012) shows that the inverse of the world value-added to gross export ratio can be interpreted as
a weighted average count of the number of border crossings associated with producing $1 of final goods,
where the weights reflect the value added by each country.
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Figure 1
Sector Shares in Total World Value-Added and Gross Exports
.8
Gross exports

.67

Value−added exports

.6

.41

.39

.4

.20
.2

.16
.11
.02

.04

0
Agriculture

Non−Manufacturing
Industrial Production

Manufacturing

Services

Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations.
Notes: Data are for 2008. Agriculture includes Forestry, Hunting, and Fishing. Non-Manufacturing
Industrial Production includes Mining and Quarrying, Electricity/Gas/Water Supply, and Construction.
Manufacturing is the remainder of Industrial Production.

Among other determinants, the ratio of value-added to gross exports is strongly
negatively correlated with the share of manufacturing in total exports ( Johnson and
Noguera 2012a). This observation relates back to Fact 2. The ratio of value-added
to gross exports is lowest in manufacturing, so the composition of trade matters.
Fact 4: Gaps between bilateral value-added and gross exports are large and heterogeneous
across trade partners.
Table 3 reports the ratio of value-added to gross exports for the top four exporting countries for alternative destination countries and composite regions. Though
regional aggregation obscures many interesting bilateral details, it serves to highlight
some key aspects of the data.
First, there is as much variation across bilateral partners as there is across
source countries. For Germany, the ratio of value-added to gross exports ranges
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Table 2
The Ratio of Value-Added to Gross Exports for the Top 20 Exporting Countries
WIOD
2008

WIOD
Change 1995–2008

Johnson–Noguera
Change 1970–2008

Germany
United States
China
Japan
United Kingdom
France
Italy
Netherlands
Canada
South Korea
Russia
Belgium
Spain
Taiwan
Mexico
India
Sweden
Australia
Brazil
Austria

0.69
0.78
0.75
0.80
0.78
0.71
0.73
0.62
0.76
0.58
0.92
0.53
0.69
0.51
0.70
0.78
0.66
0.84
0.86
0.65

−0.10
−0.05
−0.09
−0.12
−0.01
−0.08
−0.07
−0.06
0.02
−0.18
0.00
−0.07
−0.09
−0.16
−0.03
−0.12
−0.08
−0.04
−0.05
−0.10

−0.16
−0.14
−0.20
−0.09
−0.04
−0.13
−0.12
−0.11
−0.11
−0.18

−0.21
−0.20
−0.13
−0.06
−0.10
−0.17

Minimum
Median
Maximum

0.51
0.72
0.92

−0.18
−0.08
0.02

−0.21
−0.14
−0.04

−0.15
−0.17

Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations, Johnson and Noguera (2014).
Notes: The column “WIOD 2008” is the ratio of value-added exports to gross exports for each country in
2008 from the World Input-Output Database. The column “WIOD change 1995–2008” is the change
in this ratio from 1995 to 2008. The column “Johnson–Noguera change 1970–2008” is the change in
the ratio of value-added exports to gross exports for each country from 1970 to 2008, from Johnson and
Noguera (2014). Blank entries in that column reflect missing data. Exporting countries are ordered top
to bottom by total gross exports in 2008.

from 0.6 to 1 across destinations. Second, value-added exports to some destinations
exceed gross exports. For example, Japanese value-added exports to the United
States are 7 percent larger than their gross exports. This reflects the fact that Japan
exports intermediate goods to third countries (such as China) that then re-exports
those intermediates to the United States embodied in final goods. Third, the ratio
of value-added to gross exports tends to be lower within regions or regional trade
agreement blocs than across them. For example, US value-added exports are
64 percent as large as gross exports to Mexico and Canada, while US value-added
exports are about 90 percent as large as gross exports to the European Union
or Japan. Similar patterns hold for Japan and Germany among their Asian and
European Union partners, respectively.
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Table 3
Ratio of Bilateral Value-Added to Gross Exports for Top 4 Exporting Countries
Partner country or region

Source country
China
Germany
Japan
United States

United
States
0.84
0.99
1.07

Canada European
and Mexico Union
0.71
0.80
0.86
0.64

0.79
0.60
1.06
0.87

China

0.77
0.69
0.83

Japan
0.73
1.00
0.91

Other
Asia

Other

0.52
0.70
0.53
0.69

0.73
0.74
0.76
0.79

Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations.
Notes: Data are for 2008. “Other Asia” includes Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan. “Other” includes
all other destinations not listed in table.

Fact 5: Changes in value-added relative to gross exports have been heterogeneous across
countries and bilateral trade partners.
Table 2 also reports changes in the ratio of value-added to gross exports for each
of the top 20 exporters for two time periods. Column 2 records the change in this
ratio over the 1995–2008 period, while column 3 records changes over the longer
1970–2008 period. To summarize, some countries have seen declines on the order
of 20 percentage points, while others have seen no change—or even increases. In
general, declines have been larger in fast-growing emerging markets than other
countries, largely due to the rapid increase in the share of manufactures in their
gross exports over time ( Johnson and Noguera 2014).
Drilling down to the bilateral level, changes in the ratio of value-added to gross
exports are also very different across bilateral trade partners. One stylized fact is
that the ratio has declined more for nearby countries and countries within the same
region ( Johnson and Noguera 2012b, 2014). A second fact is that the ratio has
declined more for countries that have adopted regional trade agreements with one
another ( Johnson and Noguera 2014).

International Macroeconomics
Using value-added export data in place of gross exports sheds new light on
some old questions in international macroeconomics. Here, I consider three of
those questions. First, how large are the spillover effects of changes in foreign
final expenditure on domestic economic activity? Second, how do international
relative price changes—for example, due to exchange rate movements—influence
competitiveness? Third, how large must price changes be in order to close
trade imbalances?
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Tracking Foreign Expenditure Changes Back Home
How much does US GDP fall when foreign final expenditure falls? Would the
US economy be hit harder by a fall in expenditure in Italy or Canada? To answer
these questions, analysts traditionally look at US gross exports, and assume that
those exports are produced entirely within the United States. They use the share
of multilateral or bilateral exports in GDP to summarize the exposure of the
US economy to foreign expenditure changes.
A value-added perspective on trade highlights several flaws in this approach.
First, a dollar of US exports does not generate a dollar of US value added. As a
result, the ratio of exports to GDP will overstate how much GDP falls when exports
decline. Second, bilateral gross exports do not capture how much value added the
United States sells in particular destinations. For example, a significant share of US
exports to Canada are used to produce Canadian goods consumed in the United
States, so gross exports overstate US exposure to Canadian demand shocks. Alternatively, gross exports may understate exposure in other cases. For example, the
US exports inputs to Germany that are used to produce German goods consumed
in Italy. Thus, the US economy is more exposed to changes in Italian demand than
gross exports would indicate.
Looking directly at value-added exports side-steps these problems. Value-added
exports directly link foreign final expenditure to demand for domestic value added,
removing gross exports as the “middle man” in the calculation. Though this intuition
is straightforward, explaining how it emerges directly from standard macro-models
takes some additional effort. There are two alternative theoretical approaches.
The first approach is to write down the model entirely in value-added terms,
ignoring trade in intermediate inputs entirely. Though this approach may initially
sound strange, it is in fact completely standard—for example, the canonical international real business cycle fits this description (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
1994). On the supply side, producers combine primary factors (labor and capital)
to produce value added. On the demand side, consumers directly purchase and
consume value added originating from different source countries. Given this structure, value-added exports are the appropriate data to use in measuring trade and
calibrating preference parameters.4 And the share of bilateral value-added exports
in total value added is the appropriate weight to use in estimating how much demand
for domestic value added falls in response to changes in foreign final expenditure.
The second approach is to embrace input trade, and write down the model
in gross terms (Ambler, Cardia, and Zimmerman 2002; Johnson forthcoming).
In this case, producers would combine primary factors with intermediate inputs
to produce gross output, which may be dedicated to either final or intermediate
use. And preferences would be defined over consumption of final goods. In Bems

4

This observation is closely related to a recent point raised by Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi
(2013). In a closed economy, they argue that expenditure on value added from each sector, rather than
expenditure on final goods from each sector, should be used to calibrate preferences in multisector
models that feature value-added production functions for sectoral output.
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and Johnson (2012), we show that value-added export shares are the appropriate
weights to attach to foreign final expenditure changes in this type of model as well.5
Using value-added exports in place of gross exports has three implications. First,
all countries appear less exposed to foreign expenditure changes, many substantially so. Remember, the ratio of value-added to gross exports is less than one, and
these adjustments are getting larger over time due to declines in value-added to
export ratios. Second, at the sector-level, the manufacturing sector looks substantially less exposed, and nonmanufacturing sectors look substantially more exposed
to foreign shocks, because manufacturing exports are smaller and services exports
larger in value-added terms. Third, the importance of shocks originating in particular export destinations differs—with some countries becoming more important,
while others are becoming less important, than one would guess based on gross
bilateral exports. This follows from differences in bilateral value-added to export
ratios across partners.
To illustrate the magnitude of these adjustments, I graph the ratios of gross and
value-added exports to GDP for the top four exporters in Figure 2. Aggregating across
sectors, the ratio of value-added exports to GDP is generically smaller than the ratio
of gross exports to GDP. At the sector level, the ratio of value-added exports from
the manufacturing sector to manufacturing GDP is dramatically smaller than the
ratio of gross exports from the manufacturing sector to manufacturing GDP, about
half as large for these countries. Further, differences in openness across sectors
are reduced when measured using the ratio of value-added exports to GDP, rather
than the ratio of gross exports to GDP. Manufacturing openness drops a lot, and
nonmanufacturing openness rises (doubling in three of the four countries). This
convergence in measured openness will be important below in thinking through
the mechanics of trade balance adjustment.6
Turning to bilateral data, there are also differences between bilateral value-added
versus gross exports to GDP ratios, particuarly for manufacturing. For the United
States, the ratio of bilateral gross manufacturing exports to manufacturing GDP
is about 0.17 for Canada and only .07 for value-added exports. For exports to the
European Union, the comparable figures are 0.11 for gross exports and 0.06 for
value-added exports. Therefore, while Canada looks like a more important export
destination in gross terms, the European Union is equally important when we focus
on how much US value added is actually being consumed in each country. The
reason, of course, is that so much of US gross exports to Canada are embodied in
Canadian exports back to the US economy. These value-added adjustments should
be taken into account in evaluating the strength of bilateral demand linkages.
5

In Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010, 2011), we use a Leontief assumption to derive the same result from
a global input-output accounting framework. This is a special case of the more general model in Bems
and Johnson (2012).
6
In the absence of value-added trade data, one might be tempted to use the ratio of gross exports to
gross output in calibrating openness. This is not only wrong in theory, it is also troublesome in practice
because it makes the economy and individual sectors look too closed. For example, the aggregate ratio
of gross exports to gross output in China is 0.11, less than half the ratio of value-added exports to GDP.
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Figure 2
Aggregate and Sector-Level Openness for Top Four Exporting Countries
A: Aggregate Exports/GDP
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Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations.
Notes: Data are for 2008. The category labeled “Other” includes all nonmanufacturing industries.
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Relative Price Changes and Competitiveness
How do changes in relative prices influence demand for value added from
particular source countries? For example, how much would a reminbi appreciation lower demand for Chinese value added? What about if the reminbi appreciates
against the yen, but holds its value against the dollar? How should we aggregate those
heterogenous bilateral relative price changes to evaluate Chinese competitiveness?
The answers to these questions can be somewhat different depending on
whether one takes a value-added or conventional view of trade. For example,
suppose the renminbi appreciates (against all countries) and factor prices in all
countries are fixed in producer currencies. How much this appreciation raises the
relative price of Chinese exports depends on how much Chinese value added is
embodied in them. Since China imports intermediate inputs to produce exports,
China’s export price depends on both the price of Chinese and foreign value
added. As a result, a lower value-added to export ratio means that the appreciation
will have a lower pass-through rate into export prices. The less these prices rise, the
less demand for Chinese exports, and hence Chinese value added, falls.
Matters become more complicated when three countries are linked via production chains. For example, consider a scenario in which Japan exports computer
parts to China, who then assembles them into a laptop and exports the laptop to
the United States. If the Japanese yen depreciates against the US dollar (while the
Chinese renminbi is fixed against the US dollar), then this brings down the price
of Chinese-assembled laptops in the United States. This implies increased demand
for laptops, which generates additional demand for value added from the Chinese
computer assembly industry. Thus, even though there is no bilateral movement
in the renminbi–dollar exchange rate, vertical input trade linkages imply that
exchange rates vis-a-vis third-country input suppliers influence export competitiveness and hence demand for one’s own value added.
As these examples illustrate, sorting out the effects of exchange rate movements
(or other shocks to relative prices) on demand for exports and value added can be
complicated. Fortunately, data on value-added exports can help cut through the
fog. Since countries ultimately produce and trade value added, a natural approach
would be to use price changes for value added originating from different countries,
combined with trade weights based on value-added exports, to construct “real effective exchange rates” for value added (Bems and Johnson 2012).7 These composite
exchange rate indexes capture the effect of changes in relative value-added prices
on demand for value added from each country.
In practice, this value-added approach to evaluating exchange rate movements
leads to quantitatively different conclusions than conventional approaches. For
example, in Bems and Johnson (2012), we find that, from 2000 to 2009, China’s

7

Though value-added real exchange rates can be motivated directly by appealing to value-added models,
in Bems and Johnson (2012), we derive value-added weights from a constant elasticity of substitution
model written in gross terms under the assumption that elasticities of substitution are equal in preferences and production functions.
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value-added real effective exchange rate appreciated by 20 percentage points more
than the conventional index used by the IMF. We also find that appreciations in
value-added exchange rates for the European periphery prior to the euro-crisis
were larger than implied by conventional indexes. The value-added perspective thus
indicates that China’s exchange rate has become less misaligned (consistent with
rebalancing) and intra-EU rates were more misaligned (consistent with the build-up
of imbalances within the European Union) than conventional indexes would indicate. The most important reason for these differences is that conventional indices
are constructed using consumer price indexes, which are poor guides in practice to
how the relative price of value added across countries, and hence demand for value
added, changes over time.
Adjustment of Trade Imbalances
The geopolitics of external adjustment are often acrimonious. Not surprisingly
therefore, the fact that bilateral trade balances are not equal in gross and value-added
terms has attracted substantial attention in policy circles (Xing and Detert 2010;
Lamy 2011; Johnson and Noguera 2012a). The value-added view of trade also has
important implications for adjustment of multilateral trade balances—an insight
that is less commonly appreciated, but perhaps of greater practical importance.
At the outset, it is crucial to emphasize that a country’s multilateral trade balance
is identical when measured in gross and value-added terms. The national accounts
GDP identity states that total value added produced minus total final expenditure
(including domestic and imported final goods) is equal to the gross trade balance.
Because all final expenditure is ultimately value added purchased from some source,
then this is the same as saying that value added produced minus value-added consumed
(including domestic and imported value added) equals the gross trade balance. Since
value added produced minus value added consumed is equal to value-added exports
less value-added imports—that is, the value-added trade balance—the value-added
trade balance equals the gross trade balance by construction.
This mechanical equality does not imply that the value-added view has nothing
to contribute in analyzing external adjustment. To focus the discussion, consider a
standard question asked by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007): how much does the
consumption real exchange rate—that is, relative consumer price levels—need to
change to close the trade imbalance? The answer to this question depends on whether
one uses value-added or gross trade data in calibrating the underlying macroeconomic
model. Bems (2013) points out three distinct channels that can lead to different results.
First, the economy looks more closed when one uses value-added exports to
GDP, rather than the ratio of gross exports to GDP, as the measure of how much
output is exported. With a more closed economy (equivalently, stonger home bias
in consumption), the “transfer problem” associated with closing imbalances is
worse. Specifically, the decline in home expenditure relative to foreign expenditure
needed to close home’s deficit leads to a larger decline in home’s terms of trade
(the price of home relative to foreign tradables), thus increasing the size of the
required real exchange rate change.
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Second, manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors look more similar in
terms of openness in value-added terms. This tends to reduce the size of the intranational, cross-sector relative price adjustment associated with closing the external
imbalance, and hence reduce the required real exchange rate adjustment. Essentially, reducing the asymmetry in openness across sectors means that demand for
output declines more uniformly across sectors (and hence cross-sector relative price
changes are smaller) following the decline in home expenditure associated with
closing the imbalance.
The third channel concerns elasticities, not openness. Typically, macroresearchers plug elasticities (like the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods) that are estimated using gross data into value-added models. Bems
(2013) argues this approach overstates the appropriate elasticities for cross-sector
or cross-country substitution of value added. Converting the estimated gross elasticities of substitution into levels appropriate for value-added models, he shows that the
resulting value-added elasticities are lower than the gross elasticities typically used
in the literature. Using these lower value-added elasticities increases the size of the
real exchange rate adjustment needed to close imbalances.
How these channels net out depends on the particular country under examination. Bems (2013) works out the net effects for a range of countries. Not surprisingly,
accounting correctly for intermediate inputs in calibration matters most for countries like China, Mexico, or South Korea that are deeply integrated into global
supply chains. For a decline in the trade surplus equal to 1 percent of GDP, the
real exchange rate appreciates by 15–25 percent more in a model parameterized
to be consistent with the value-added data, relative to the conventional approach
that mixes value-added and gross data. Specific numbers aside, this analysis points
to the usefulness of looking at value-added export data in studying the mechanics
of external adjustment.
Shifting our attention to the bilateral level, bilateral trade balances are generally not equal in gross and value-added terms. This is true not only if bilateral gross
trade is unbalanced, but holds even if bilateral gross trade is balanced.8 For illustration, Figure 3 plots United States bilateral gross and value-added trade balances
with China and the composite of Japan and South Korea using World Input-Output
Database data. The US trade deficit with China looks smaller in value-added terms
than it does in gross terms, while the deficit with Japan and South Korea looks correspondingly larger. The maximal difference in percentage terms between the gross
and value-added US–China imbalance is about 23 percent in 2004 ($124.5 billion
versus $94 billion). In terms of absolute values, the gap peaks at $42 billion in 2007.
Almost surely, this figure understates the true reallocation of trade imbalances.
The reason is that the World Input-Output Database (like most other available

8

With balanced bilateral trade, differences in bilateral value-added to export ratios for exports from
country i to country j versus from j to i can generate imbalanced bilateral value-added trade. With imbalanced bilateral trade, the average level of value added to export ratios for a given country pair will scale
up/down the value-added imbalance relative to the gross imbalance ( Johnson and Noguera 2012a).
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Figure 3
United States Trade Deficits with China, Japan, and South Korea
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Sources: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and author’s calculations. Deficits for Japan and South
Korea are combined in the figure.

input-output data) does not account for the high share of pure “processing trade” in
Chinese exports. Specifically, just over half of Chinese exports are produced under
its processing trade regime, where firms are allowed to import inputs duty-free if
the resulting output is exported. Given these incentives, the imported input intensity of these firms is substantially higher than the average Chinese firm. Standard
input-output tables report input requirements for the average firm only, however.
Therefore, they understate the import content of exports for China, and thus overstate domestic value-added in Chinese exports.9
Adjusting value-added calculations to account for this bias, Koopman, Wang, and
Wei (2012) find that the Chinese domestic content in exports from the processing
trade sector was only about 25 percent in 2002, as compared to about 90 percent
for normal nonprocessing exports. Correctly accounting for these discrepancies

9

Although I focus on pure processing trade here, the core idea is more general. Micro-data indicate that
export and import participation are highly correlated at the firm-level. Therefore, the imported input
intensity of exporting firms is likely higher than that of the average firm in most countries. As in the case
of processing trade, ignoring this fact (as standard input-output tables do) leads one to overestimate the
domestic value-added content of exports.
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lowers the ratio of Chinese domestic content exports from about 0.75 to 0.55 in
2002. Drawing on this work, in Johnson and Noguera (2012a), we implement an
adjustment for processing trade in China within the global input-output framework and find that it leads the China–US trade balance to shrink by an additional
10 percentage points. Therefore, we find that the difference between the gross
and value-added US–China imbalance was actually likely closer to 30–40 percent in
2004, roughly doubling the unadjusted calculation.
These adjustments to bilateral balances suggest that the burden of adjustment
associated with closing the US trade balance would be redistributed away from
China and toward Japan and Korea, in line with the reallocation of value-added
trade balances. To date, however, there has been no work assessing how important
these adjustments are quantitatively. This is a topic for future work.

International Trade
Value-added exports also provide a new perspective on traditional topics in
international trade. I highlight applications related to the impact of frictions on
trade, specialization patterns, the factor content of trade, and trade policy.
Trade Frictions
What is the impact of frictions—tariffs, nontariff barriers, transport costs, and
others—on patterns of consumption versus production across countries? This question is typically addressed by examining the effect of frictions on gross production
and trade. As a result, we know a lot about where gross output is produced and the
destinations to which it is shipped. We know very little, however, about how trade
frictions influence trade in value added, and hence differences between where
value added is produced versus where it is consumed.
To launch this discussion, it is helpful to refer back to the five facts laid out
earlier in this paper. We noted the significant differences between bilateral gross
and value-added exports, and that these bilateral differences are systematically
related to common proxies for trade costs. For example, the ratio of bilateral
value-added to gross exports tends to be lower for country pairs located in the
same region, and pairs that are separated by shorter distances. It is also lower for
pairs of countries that have adopted regional trade agreements, and even lower
for pairs that have adopted “deep” agreements, such as customs unions, common
markets, and economic unions.
These underlying patterns all suggest that trade frictions have different effects
on value-added trade versus gross trade. One way to think about this is that standard trade frictions impede gross trade, and hence induce the patterns of final
and intermediate goods trade that we observe in the data. This trade in final and
intermediate goods gives rise to the global input-output structure. As we use that
input-output structure to compute value-added trade flows, we are implicitly aggregating the effect of frictions on gross trade to measure the composite impact of
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those frictions on value-added trade. The input-output structure is a device to map
gross trade frictions into implied value-added trade frictions, which measure the
reduced form impact of the full set of gross frictions in determining value-added
consumption patterns.
One insight from thinking through this aggregation process is that both
bilateral trade costs and trade costs between third countries directly influence bilateral value-added exports, whereas only bilateral trade costs directly influence
bilateral gross trade (Noguera 2012). For this reason, value-added trade frictions
are a manifestation not only of bilateral frictions, but rather the entire matrix of
trade frictions among all countries.
Two points follow. First, one important reason that value-added exports are less
sensitive to bilateral distance between countries than gross exports is that value added
can be traded via third countries. For example, the United States can export intermediate inputs to Europe that are embodied in final European goods shipped to Russia.
In a sense, Russia is then effectively “closer” to the United States than it looks on a
map. Second, changes in trade costs between third countries can have a direct impact
on bilateral value-added exports to other countries. For example, a tariff cut between
Japan and China would have a direct effect on value-added exports from Japan to the
United States. This point has interesting implications for policy discussions, which typically focus on bilateral rather than third-country barriers. I return to this point below.
Turning from cross-sectional to time series facts, we have seen large declines in
the ratio of value-added to gross exports over the past few decades, with particularly
large declines in fast-growing emerging markets. An important question is: do changes
in gross trade frictions explain this divergence? The answer, by and large, is yes.
Using a multisector gravity model with trade in both final and intermediate
goods, in Johnson and Noguera (2014), we decompose changes in the global
input-output structure into components attributable to changes in trade frictions,
changes in endowments and productivity, and changes in generic sector-to-sector
input linkages or sector-level final expenditure shares. We find that changes in
trade frictions explain nearly the entire decline in the ratio of value-added to gross
exports for the world as a whole. We also explain differences across countries, where
countries with large declines in trade frictions have seen particularly large declines
in value-added relative to gross exports.
These results are consistent with the idea that value-added trade frictions have
declined more slowly than gross trade frictions, leading to disproportionate growth
in gross relative to value-added trade. Together with the discussion of bilateral
differences, they point to new ways to think about the impact of frictions on trade.
Specialization Patterns
As we have seen, the sector-composition of gross exports can be quite different
than the sector-composition of value-added exports. Looking at value-added composition forces us to revisit what we know about patterns of specialization.
This point is driven home by considering the example of China. The top panel
of Figure 4 records the share of individual sectors in Chinese gross and value-added
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Figure 4
Sector-Level Export Shares for China
A: Export Shares, All Sectors
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exports. As in most countries, nonmanufacturing sectors are substantially more
important in value-added than gross terms. The more striking fact is that the share
of Electrical and Optical Equipment shrinks dramatically, from about one-third of
China’s exports to just over one-tenth. This difference is of course consistent with
the fact that these goods tend to be produced from imported intermediates that
are assembled in China. Further, the bottom panel of Figure 4 plots the share of
Electrical and Optical Equipment in value-added and gross exports over time.
The share of this sector in gross exports has almost doubled since 1995, while the
value-added share has barely changed. As such, gross and value-added trade provide
very different pictures about what China genuinely produces and sells to the rest of
the world.
This example illustrates a general point: what countries export may be very
different from what they actually contribute to the production process. Countries
that look like dominant exporters in particular sectors may in fact contribute very
little value added to those exports. This basic point should be borne in mind in
analyses of comparative advantage (Koopman, Wang, and Wei 2014). It should also
factor into efforts to evaluate export sophistication across countries (Schott 2008,
Wang and Wei 2010), or whether it matters for economic growth what countries
export (Hausman, Hwang, and Rodrick 2007).
The Factor Content of Trade
Thus far, we have focused on the value-added content of international trade.
Beneath this trade in value added lies trade in primary factors or production tasks. If
one knows the quantities of factors needed to produce a unit of GDP in each sector,
then one can use these to convert value-added export flows into factor flows. The
difference between the quantity of domestic factors needed to produce value-added
exports and the quantity of foreign factors needed to produce value-added imports
is equal to the net factor content of trade, which measures factors embodied in GDP
minus factors embodied in consumption. Moreover, the preceding logic is identical
if one uses task contents in place of factor contents.
Value-added export data are useful for performing factor/task content calculations for two reasons. First, using them sidesteps an important conceptual problem
with conventional approaches to factor content calculations. Specifically, these
approaches made strong, increasingly untenable assumptions—either that gross
exports are produced entirely from domestic gross output, or that imported inputs
are produced with identical input requirements as domestic output. Relaxing these
assumptions requires tracking trade in intermediates across countries and sectors,
just as global input-output frameworks are designed to do. Therefore, Reimer
(2006) and Trefler and Zhu (2010) proposed methods to compute the multilateral
net factor content of trade (that is, the net quantity of factors each country exports
to the rest of the world) using global input-output tables. While their approach
cannot be used to recover bilateral factor trade, bilateral value-added export data
can be used for this purpose. This is another advantage to using value-added
data. Measuring bilateral trade in factors enables one to test bilateral predictions of
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the factor-contents theory that emerge when factor price equalization breaks down
(Debaere 2003; Choi and Krishna 2004).
What are the implications of using value-added exports to compute factor
contents? The conventional approach overstates factor trade because it assumes
that gross exports of a country are produced using that country’s technology
alone. Instead, with traded inputs, gross exports of each country are produced
using a convex combination of domestic and foreign technologies. By making
effective production techniques more similar at home and abroad, traded inputs
attenuate measured factor trade (Reimer 2006; Johnson 2011). Thus, appropriately
accounting for intermediates lowers the measured factor content of trade relative
to measurements that allow for differences in production techniques but do not
incorporate traded intermediates. More work is needed to quantify the effect these
adjustments have on tests of factor-contents theory.
Trade Policy Analysis
The rise of global supply chains has altered the costs and benefits of protection in a variety of ways (Baldwin 2012; Blanchard 2013). Yet empirical research
on two-way interactions between trade policy and global supply chains is sparse.
I expect that improvements in global input-output data and new measures of trade
in value added will facilitate future work in this area. Therefore, I want to highlight
a few specific ways in which the value-added analysis, and global input-output data
more generally, can inform trade policy analysis.
First, the fact that gross exports and imports contain both foreign and domestic
value-added is a core element of the value-added view of trade. The presence of
domestic value added in imports gives rise to domestic constituencies that ought
to favor liberalization. For example, exporters of intermediate goods that are then
embodied in imported final goods should favor lower tariffs on those final goods
imports. On the flip side, the presence of foreign value-added in exports ought to
give rise to lobbying by exporters to liberalize imports of intermediates. As global
supply chains become more important, these pressures should grow. With the new
availability of data on input-output linkages across borders, the time seems ripe to
investigate the role of these forces in determining trade policy.
Second, an important benefit of value-added export data is that it tracks value
added to the final consumer even as it moves through third countries. This role for
third parties has implications for trade policy. For example, a regional trade agreement between countries A and B is likely to increase trade in value added between
countries C and A when C is an input supplier to country B. This trade-creating
effect of the regional trade agreement, and third-country liberalizations more
generally, ought to figure into policy analysis.
Third, global input-output tables and value-added trade data can potentially
help quantify the extent to which global supply chains magnify the impact of trade
barriers, an effect which is reminiscent of an older literature on the “effective rate of
protection” (Yi 2003, 2010). In models of multistage production, trade costs are paid
multiple times as goods pass across borders through a global supply chain, and trade
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costs imposed on the value of gross output impose a heavy burden when evaluated
relative to the actual value added being traded. Building on this intuition, Koopman,
Wang, and Wei (2014) call for value-added data to be used in quantifying these effects.
While the potential role of supply chains in magnifying trade barriers deserves
attention, several caveats ought to be borne in mind. First, commonly used multisector
models with “roundabout production” can match both gross and value-added trade
simultaneously, yet they imply zero magnification of trade barriers. Second, in Johnson
and Moxnes (2013), we caution that even models with sequential multistage production, which allow for magnification effects, do not deliver significant magnification
when calibrated to match observed levels of final and intermediate goods trade. Given
the potential importance of amplification effects in understanding the costs of protection, this area demands more research.

Concluding Remarks
The rise of global supply chains has led to far-reaching changes in the nature of
international trade. In this article, I have focused on one particular implication: gross
trade is not equal to trade in value added. While this fact has been known for some
time, gaps between gross and value-added trade have only recently been quantified.
These gaps are markers for differences in global supply chain activity across countries and over time. They are also important to keep in mind in quantitative work.
Researchers should beware of mixing gross trade data with value-added production
data, or using gross trade data in applications where the underlying theory is based
on value added concepts. For both these reasons, I expect value-added export data
to figure prominently in international macroeconomic and trade research and
policy analysis going forward.
Because research using global input-output frameworks is still relatively new,
much remains to be done not only in analyzing trade in value added, but also with
regard to improving the data underlying its measurement. Enhanced international
cooperation to measure global supply chain activity more accurately would be ideal.
Even in its absence, however, much could be done to improve measurement on a
country-by-country basis. For example, value-added export measurement would be
improved by additional work on quantifying differences in imported input use across
exporting versus nonexporting firms and incorporating these into input-output
tables. Enhanced data collection for countries with large “processing trade”
sectors—like China, Mexico, and other emerging markets—would be a good start.
Another issue that deserves attention is how we track imported input use behind
the border. That is, we need better data on where inputs from particular source
countries go (that is, which firms/sectors use them) after they enter the country.
Addressing these issues would increase the accuracy of value-added measurements.
Finally, though I have focused on using global input-output frameworks to
compute value-added exports, the underlying data is also valuable in other applications. Most obviously, the data can be used to parameterize trade models written in

Robert C. Johnson

141

gross terms with both cross-sector and cross-country input linkages. These models are
useful in their own right. For example, trade policy is typically conducted using instruments levied on gross trade, like tariffs, so it is natural to start by analyzing trade policy
in gross models. Nonetheless, the deep goal ought to be to better understand how
gross policy instruments induce changes in value-added trade, since value added is
directly connected to both factor income and final expenditure (and hence welfare).
Accomplishing this goal requires a better understanding of the theoretical mapping
between gross and value-added representations of international trade.
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